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A B S T R A C T
The article presents ﬁndings from a research project which explored how experiences of higher education
supported – or not – the emergence of developmental leadership and the formation of networks among leaders of
three political and social movements in the Philippines in the post-Marcos era. Based on life history interviews
with key leaders, the study points to the importance of diﬀerent forms of social capital, especially bridging
capital, in navigating a stratiﬁed system within this oligarchical democracy. Experiences of higher education
were important for leaders' development, but not necessarily in predictable ways.
1. Introduction
This article interrogates the relationship between higher education
and ‘developmental leadership’ through a case study of the Philippines.
It presents the ﬁndings of a research project1 which explored how in-
dividuals’ experiences of higher education supported – or not – the
emergence of developmental leadership and the formation of networks
among leaders of three important political and social movements in the
post-Marcos era.
The study was based on life history interviews (2012–2015) with 41
elite members of three political or social reform movements in the post-
Marcos era. The article begins with a brief overview of the concepts and
evidence that underpin the study’s exploration of the relationship be-
tween higher education and developmental leadership. The study’s
ﬁndings are shaped profoundly by the political and educational con-
texts of these times in the Philippines. The article therefore then sets out
relevant milestones and shaping factors in the political, economic and
educational development of the Philippines in the post-Marcos era,
given the importance of these for understanding the positioning of these
developmental leaders. The methodology is explained subsequently.
Finally, the ﬁndings are presented within the context of the theoretical
framework and the concept of crossover reformists.
2. The relationship between higher education and developmental
leadership: concepts and evidence
The concept of developmental leadership bridges political science
and development studies. It acknowledges the human agency of re-
formist individuals as a signiﬁcant causal factor in social and political
change, and signals the role of coalitions and networks in overcoming
barriers to collective action and facilitating the achievement of shared
goals (Leftwich, 2009; Lyne de Ver, 2009). Conversely, predatory lea-
ders and their networks can thwart social and political progress, even
under the most promising of material and structural conditions
(Bavister-Gould, 2011). At some point in their life trajectories, in-
dividual developmental leaders need to acquire the knowledge, skills
and attitudes that make their personal success as reformers possible,
and they also need to form the networks and coalitions which allow
them to exercise these. Given the well-documented correlation between
education, aspiration and civic engagement (Campbell, 2009; Brannelly
et al., 2011), study at university is likely to be a meaningful phase for
developmental leaders in terms of their personal growth and also in
relation to their accumulation of social capital of various forms. In
general, higher education has the potential to promote social cohesion
by, for example, creating opportunities to discuss sensitive issues and
by modelling good institutional behaviours including tolerance, fairness
and meritocracy. The realization of this potential, however, depends on
good institutional governance as well as the nature of interactions
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facilitated by staﬀ members.
Literature on developmental leadership oﬀers considerable evidence
that, on the one hand, there is a positive correlation between societies
with higher rates of tertiary enrolment and good governance in-
gredients including voice and accountability, political stability and the
absence of violence and terrorism, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Brannelly et al., 2011).
Additionally, there is evidence from studies in a variety of contexts that
individual leaders who might be labelled as developmental are (with
exceptions) much better educated than leaders who are not (Tadros,
2011; Jones et al., 2014; Sebudubudu, 2009; Brautigam and Diolle,
2009; Theron, 2011; Phillips, 2013).
Leftwich (2009, p 23) has argued that the thinking skills developed
through high-quality higher education are key to this relationship.
Tertiary education – especially in the social sciences and law – en-
ables participants to understand better the problems of collective
action and that their resolution is essential for development. The
capacity to think in terms of general concepts and relationships, and
to understand, for example, the idea of public goods, beyond in-
dividual or group interests, appears to be one positive advantage of
tertiary education. But above all is the capacity to analyse and un-
derstand complex socio-economic and political problems – what
Stiglitz (2003: 77) refers to as ‘scientiﬁc’ ways of thinking – is one
crucial beneﬁt of higher education and a necessary but not suﬃcient
attribute of eﬀective developmental leadership.
In addition, leaders have to deploy ‘multiple framings’ for diﬀerent
audiences to ensure the compatibility of their messages with, for ex-
ample, international conventions or religious frameworks or national
constitutions. Higher education that promotes critical thinking, exposes
future leaders to people who think diﬀerently from themselves, and
develops debating and presentation skills can develop these (Jones
et al., 2014). A survey of the above literature also suggests a further list
of ingredients of institutions to facilitate a positive commitment to the
values that underpin developmental leadership: meritocratic selection,
a strong institutional ethos of patriotism and social consciousness, and
close mentoring and role-model relationships between teachers and
learners.
Beyond the skills for individuals, tertiary education can provide
excellent opportunities for coalition building. Not only are develop-
mental leaders more likely to be well-educated: case study research
from a range of contexts suggests that there are beneﬁts to them
studying together (Leftwich, 2009; Phillips, 2011; Brautigam and
Diolle, 2009; Jones et al., 2014; Grebe and Natrass, 2009). This de-
velops deep levels of trust and facilitates future collective agency.
Boarding schools in post-independence Ghana and Somaliland, for ex-
ample, created a particularly intimate setting that concentrated the
capacity to nurture future leaders, generating the label ‘nurseries’ for
developmental leadership. In Ghana, for example, university was the
source of the most important connections that developmental leaders
had in their future professional lives (Jones et al., 2014).
It is not only a question of meeting future direct collaborators. The
ﬁndings regarding the role of networks formed through higher educa-
tion point speciﬁcally to the importance of social capital, with its
beneﬁts of generalized reciprocity, facilitation of co-ordination and
communication, and ampliﬁed sense of self from ‘I’ to ‘we’ (Putnam,
2000). However, diﬀerent forms of social capital bring diﬀerent bene-
ﬁts to the individual and potentially diﬀerent social impact. Putnam
(2000) distinguishes between bonding capital and bridging capital.
Bonding capital refers to relations between homogenous groups (such
as family ties or close networks of people from similar socio-economic
and ethnic backgrounds), while bridging capital refers to interactions
across heterogenous groups (Putnam, 2000). Bonding capital among
kinship networks or the disenfranchised can be important in societies
where there is declining trust in political institutions, including post-
conﬂict contexts (Fukuyama, 2002). However, very closely-knit social
and political organizations can be prone to cartelization and rent
seeking (Olson, 1971), vertical patronage and exclusionary practices
(Fukuyama, 2002). Bridging capital has the potential to widen the ra-
dius of trust (Fukuyama, 2002) and – as this study ﬁnds – extend the
reach of individual actors across sectoral, tribal, clan, dynastic or tra-
ditional elite loyalties, as found in Somaliland (Phillips, 2011) Bots-
wana (Sebudubudu, 2009), Ghana (Jones et al., 2014) and Yemen
(Phillips, 2013). It also helps leaders to understand ‘the other’ – whe-
ther that ‘other’ is an ally or an adversary. It thus supports leaders in
building consensus and understanding the possibilities and limits of
compromise. In our study, leaders drew on both forms of capital,
crossing between them pragmatically and strategically, just as they
crossed over between diﬀerent economic and social sectors. As well as
drawing on the concepts of bridging and bonding capital, the paper
therefore builds on Lewis’ (2013) notion of crossover reformist activ-
ities, acknowledging the limits of linear understandings of the processes
of reform in the context of permeable boundaries between sectors, and
noting the importance of ‘border crossing’ between sectors for the
successful agency of developmental leaders. Higher education can po-
tentially be a site for the development of social capital including brid-
ging capital, and for the skill set of the crossover reformer.
However, while the evidence points to positive eﬀects of HE and
suggests a range of conditions under which it might facilitate the de-
velopmental leaders’ personal growth and diverse networks, the evi-
dence is not unequivocal. Even the strong prevailing pattern of more
education = better leadership is fraught with surprising national out-
liers (Brannelly et al., 2011). The conditions outlined above for the
development of, for example, critical thinking, are not necessarily
prevalent in typical HE institutions, and this may be especially uneven
in less developed countries. Elite institutions may oﬀer higher quality
teaching and resources, but selection processes based on the ability to
pay tuition fees or be prepared for particular forms of entrance ex-
amination can be exclusionary and create conditions for cronyism
(Brannelly et al., 2011) and the worst excesses of bonding capital. The
question of the quality of HE is threatened on a number of fronts in the
current climate: the strong MDG-era emphasis on funding for primary
education, and contemporary cost-cutting and eﬃciency measures
which include ‘unbundling’ of HE to provide only speciﬁc functions (the
extreme example being MOOCs which separate teaching and learning
from all paracurricular functions) and massiﬁcation leading to com-
modiﬁcation and therefore more stratiﬁed systems which reserve the
best HE for those who can aﬀord it and therefore reinforce social di-
visions (McCowan, 2016).
In this paper, we explore these issues in context, and what it is about
this phase of education that may or may not have inﬂuenced future
developmental leaders in the particular conditions of the post-Marco,
pre-Duterte Philippines. Drawing on the personal reﬂections of a se-
lection of such leaders, the research challenges prevailing human ca-
pital arguments regarding how higher education contributes to devel-
opment.
3. Political, economic and educational development of the
Philippines
Since independence, The Philippines has had a tumultuous experi-
ence with democracy, which was interrupted when President Ferdinand
Marcos imposed martial law in 1972. Ferdinand Marcos ruled the
Philippines for 20 years. His presidency ended in 1986 when the
‘People Power’ Revolution (also known as the EDSA Revolution) forced
him out of oﬃce and into exile. People Power demonstrations began in
1983 and culminated in protests which took place in Quezon City from
the 22nd to the 25th of February 1986. The demonstrations were a
response to the government corruption that proliferated under Marcos.
The People Power movement reﬂected the strong culture of political
participation in the Philippines. Civil society in the archipelago has long
been “relatively politicized (at least compared with countries in South
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Asia such as Bangladesh and India), with close links existing between
political parties and political positions and many NGOs (Lewis, 2013:
43)”.
The ﬁnal day of the People Power protest marked both the end of
Marcos’ rule and the emergence of a democratic form of government,
headed by the new president, Corazon C. Aquino. While those involved
in the People Power movement may have expected positive changes to
result from the protests, economic and political decline as well as social
instability continued (Villanueva, 2010). Other elite groups have un-
successfully tried to challenge this political settlement in the inter-
vening years (Hedman, 2006).
At the time of the data gathering phase of the research (2013–2015)
most of the political decisions and economic activity in the Philippines
remained dominated by a relatively small group of elites. The pre-
valence of these elites in the control of institutional structures and
electoral contests has led to the deﬁnition of the political system in the
Philippines as an “oligarchical democracy” (Sidel, 2014). Apparent
democratic institutions and processes coexist with massive concentra-
tion of material resources and power that are used to defend the eco-
nomic and social position of these elites (Winters, 2011). At the local
level, the rule of families has modiﬁed or even replaced formal state
institutions. Hite (2012: 2) points out that “[i]n the Philippines, poli-
tical and ﬁnancial aﬀairs are funnelled through channels of patronage
politics – neighbourhood and clan-based political groups that oﬀer
unregulated ﬁnancial services in return for political allegiance.” Re-
gardless of class origin, Filipinos typically align themselves with
dominant clans for the purpose of gaining access to power (Gutierrez
et al., 1992).
The Philippines inherited the US system of checks and balances
between Congress, the President and an independent judiciary. In
principle, this should have prevented concentration of power. However,
the weak party discipline and the prevalent inﬂuence of powerful fa-
mily dynasties in Congress, makes it easy for these elites to block
structural reforms that aﬀect poverty and inequity levels (Anderson and
Hipgrave, 2015). Vote buying and political patronage is common in The
Philippines, and often to the detriment of investment in pro-poor po-
licies and public service delivery (Khemani, 2013).
In the Philippines there is a long history of conﬂict, including re-
ligious, ideological, territorial and clan disputes. For the past 40 years,
armed groups including separatist Muslim movement in southern
Philippines (Mindanao) have remained active. Negotiations were suc-
cessfully completed with the Mindanao-based Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) in 1996, and peace processes are well underway. The
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed on 27th
March 2014 is a negotiated political settlement between the
Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) which is to establish a new entity to replace the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It is hoped that greater au-
tonomy, self-determination and power-sharing will bring a more lasting
peace and democracy to the region.
The deeply embedded nature of oligarchical structures explains how
diverging patterns of local political economy structures materialized in
large regional inequalities and a wide range of religious, linguistic,
ethnic and social cleavages that are reﬂected in on-going conﬂicts in the
country. Poverty incidence and conﬂict are closely associated in The
Philippines, with inequality in the country highest among the
Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ADB, 2015), and poverty rates
higher in conﬂict-aﬀected provinces (42%) than in non-conﬂict pro-
vinces (22%) (Chua et al., 2013). ARMM is the only region where more
than half of the population is poor (55.8% in 2012) (NEDA, 2015).
The intersection of socio-economic status, religion and politics is
evident in education, and the higher education system is both hor-
izontally and vertically diﬀerentiated (Teichler, 2008). Horizontally,
there are many diﬀerent types of institutions, in terms of structure,
purpose and religious aﬃliation; vertically, these vary enormously in
terms of their quality and reputations. Many children from elite families
enter private schools in Manila (or in larger cities within the country),
most of which are Catholic denomination schools, reﬂecting both the
prevalence of strong Catholicism in the population, and the margin-
alization of other groups, including Muslims. Some of these elite schools
serve as ‘feeder’ schools for elite private Catholic universities, reinfor-
cing the privilege of these elites, and securing their networks among the
inﬂuential of society. In contrast, in ARMM, for the secondary level,
NER is 33.7% compared to the country's 61.2% (Symaco, 2014).
What can perhaps be considered as the elite HEIs in the country are
the top ranking University of the Philippines (UP), University of Santo
Tomas, Ateneo de Manila University and De La Salle University (QS
university rankings, 2015). All but UP are private HEIs with strong
Catholic orientation and aﬃliations to speciﬁc Catholic Orders (eg Je-
suit, Franciscan). These are also very well-established institutions;
Santo Tomas has the oldest university charter in Asia. Outreach and
immersion programmes are characteristic of the three private HEIs. For
instance, Ateneo works closely with communities through its immersion
programme which aims for its students to experience the realities faced
by marginalized sectors of society where “ (i)n the spirit of the common
good and preferential option for the poor, students will be genuinely
moved to render action in living out a faith that does justice” (Ateneo
de Manila University, 2016). The religious nature of these institutions
can contribute to the development of bonding capital, and provides a
moral framework for charitably-oriented outreach work. However, it
could also be socially exclusionary for non-Catholics or those with more
secular attitudes. UP has highly active student/academic organizations
and fraternities and a history of campus activism. The General Educa-
tion (GE) programme of UP also serves as the essence of UP’s liberal and
secular education where students are expected to achieve a ‘broad
perspective that would enable them, outside their own ﬁeld of specia-
lization, to engage with issues and realities of their own times’ (UP GE
Task Force, nd).
4. Methodology
The ﬁrst stage of the study involved choosing three movements from
which to sample developmental leaders for interview. We concentrated
on post-Marcos changes that promoted participatory democracy and
good governance. Movements and reforms that engaged diverse actors
(e.g., government oﬃcials, church leaders, civil society), interest
groups and ideologies, that occurred at diﬀerent times, and that were
spread across geographic locations in the Philippines were selected in
order to avoid a myopic or exclusionary view of social and political
networks.
4.1. Three political/social movements
Through historical-political analysis of key political, educational,
economic and democratic changes, and discussions with experts on the
Philippines, three complementary areas were chosen:
4.1.1. Public sector procurement reform (PSPR)
The Government Procurement Reform Act was signed in 2003 and
its implementing rules and regulations have been the centerpiece of the
national reforms to combat corruption and promote good governance in
the Philippines. The reforms aimed to reduce opportunities for graft and
corruption; harmonize the procurement system with international
standards and practices; and promote transparency, competitiveness,
and accountability. In the words of President Arroyo, the objective of
these reforms was “to address the public emergency borne out of the
pervasive malady of graft and corruption that has long plagued the
government procurement system, impaired public service eﬃciency,
and stunted national capacity for economic growth.” (President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo cited by Campos and Syquia, 2006:26). From a lib-
eral perspective, corruption in procurement contract awards, and cor-
ruption more generally, is the result of ﬂaws in institutional governance
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structures that obstruct market competition and distort prices. A com-
petitive, transparent, fair, and eﬃcient public procurement system is
seen by these approaches as one of the pillars of anti-corruption and
good governance reforms (Grindle, 2004), with signiﬁcant eﬀects on
sustainable economic growth and development (Kaufmann et al.,
2009). The PSPR consolidated and standardized procurement rules and
procedures for all national government agencies including govern-
ment–owned and/or controlled corporations and local government
units, which apply to procurement of goods and services, including
infrastructure projects and consulting services. Among the changes in-
troduced are the use of the Philippine Government Electronic Pro-
curement System to promote transparency and competition, the adop-
tion of open and competitive bidding in all levels of public
procurement, the professionalization of procurement oﬃcials, the in-
clusion of penal clauses and civil liability, and the institutionalization of
civil society participation in all stages of the procurement process to
improve transparency.
4.1.2. Mindanao electoral reform (2012-present, MER) (embedded within
the comprehensive agreement on the bangsamoro (CAB))
In 2010 President Benigno Simeon Aquino III’s administration
stepped up the pursuit of peace in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM is where the majority of the Philippines
Muslim population resides, including the Muslim secessionist group, the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Among Aquino’s reform eﬀorts
was his attempt to mitigate election fraud and promote democracy
through a voter re-registration programme and cleansing of the voter
list. Electoral reform was considered to be a crucial part of support for
democratization and good governance in the ARMM. This reform was
particularly important in Mindanao owing to the prevalence of violence
and intimidation during elections (Chua and Rimban, 2011). There
were also problems with voter mobilization and de-mobilization as
means to steer election outcomes. In addition, the computerization of
voting in 2010 brought new challenges to the electoral process, namely
ﬁctitious or “ghost” voters – as well as whole ghost communities.
Against this backdrop, a voter re-registration and election-monitoring
programme was implemented in July 2010. It proved diﬃcult to dis-
entangle this reform from the wider peace negotiations and CAB, and so
leaders from these processes were also interviewed.
4.1.3. Gawad Kalinga (1995 − present)
Gawad Kalinga (meaning ‘to give care’) is a social movement and
NGO aimed at alleviating poverty, focusing speciﬁcally on helping the
‘poorest of the poor’ in slum and remote rural communities and those
aﬀected by natural disasters. GK works toward a range of development
goals, aiming to ‘share prosperity, to democratize governance, to pro-
mote sustainable development, to transform and preserve Philippine
identity and culture, [and] to inspire youth’ (Rodriguez and Lacundula-
Rodriguez, 2009: ix). In some ways it works in parallel to government
with some of the same developmental aims but working within a de-
ﬁned moral agenda reﬂected in its ethos and broad-based participatory
approach. While its roots are Catholic, it works in all communities,
including Muslim communities in Mindanao. Currently, Gawad Kalinga
is active in virtually every province in the Philippines, across more than
2000 communities and in its own estimation aﬀects 60,000 families
(http://www.gk1world.com/our-scale). Construction of housing is
often the starting point, based on the need for digniﬁed shelter and
security. Beyond this is the construction of communities and neigh-
borhood associations, including the provision of values education and
leadership development programmes. While it is not a legal reform,
Gawad Kalinga (GK) was selected as a focus for this study because of its
developmental aims in eradicating poverty, fostering active citizen
participation, collaboration and cooperation among government actors,
business leaders, and civil society (Brillantes and Fernandez, 2011).
For each reform, a longlist of key individuals involved was gener-
ated, in order to inform the shortlist of relevant interviewees. The
original longlist across the reforms consisted of 120 people or organi-
sations; this was reduced to 30 to be contacted. Of these, nine re-
sponded to email or telephone contact. Attempts to contact people on
the list were challenged for a number of reasons, including the death of
key actors, but above all a culture of not responding to ‘cold calls’.
Therefore, while starting with the literature and this ‘wish list’ of in-
terviewees, in this highly networked and particularistic society we also
relied on the contacts of the Filipina member of the research team as an
additional starting point. Then, further interviewees were identiﬁed
during the ﬁeldwork period through ‘snowball’ techniques, as inter-
viewees and others on the ground recommended additional informants
signiﬁcant to the reform or movement. An interview protocol was de-
signed for the primary interviews to explore aspects of key individual
leaders’ backgrounds and educational experiences.
4.2. Fieldwork and analysis
The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 min. 10 additional key
actors and informants were also interviewed. In all 53 interviews were
conducted. 41 were recorded with permission and transcribed for the-
matic analysis. We were fortunate to secure interviews with elite (and
very busy) individuals and they were remarkably open on most sub-
jects.
They seemed genuinely pleased to be the subject of study. All but
one primary interviewee consented to be recorded and while con-
ﬁdentiality was oﬀered, most interviewees did not request it. However,
as this was not consistent, quotes are generally not attributed to par-
ticular individuals in the ﬁndings section, except where the identity of
the respondent is important or not feasible to conceal and where they
have given permission to be identiﬁed. Quotations are attributed to
interviewees through codes that identify which of the three movements
they are from, and gender markers (f-female, m-male).
The results of the initial qualitative analysis were compared across
the three movements/reforms in order to generate shared codes and to
gain a national overview. Data on educational backgrounds of the re-
spondents revealed remarkably little overlap in terms of institutions
attended, and within particular reforms, few of the interviewees ﬁrstly
or primarily knew each other through education. This was somewhat
surprising in the light of the intersection of an elitist education system
with wider power networks, and also in the light of the ﬁndings of a
study using a similar methodology in Ghana (Jones et al., 2014), but
this highlights the particularities of the Philippines context and the
boundary crossing nature of the work of these leaders.
5. Findings
The ﬁndings conﬁrm the close links that exist in the Philippines
between family and membership of political elites, which mean that
education is rarely seen as uniquely determinant of attaining a lea-
dership position. However, participants all saw their own education as
having a signiﬁcant role in their trajectory to becoming a leader, albeit
sometimes in unexpected ways.
Our analysis pointed to a range of themes: development, and how
leaders conceptualize development and good governance and how they
assess the contribution of the reforms they were involved in; leader-
ship, and how the interviewees grew into their roles, and how this
intersects with gender, ethnicity, and family privilege; and the role of
networks in the process of change and how leaders describe the im-
portance and dynamics of coalition building and their strategies for
collective action is the third theme. We drew out the implications of the
role of education in all of these, from the perspectives of the inter-
viewees and from our overall observations of the Philippines context. In
this article we introduce a further level of analysis, and focus particu-
larly on networks and how these reﬂect the workings of bridging and
bonding capital, and the prevalence of crossing over between diﬀerent
types of relationships in diﬀerent social, political and ﬁnancial sectors.
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Below we set out some of the key ways in which these developmental
leaders were crossover reformists, steering a lifecourse and day-to-day
existence which took them between sectors: public and private; gov-
ernment, the academy and civil society; and diﬀerent religious per-
spectives and groups. We consider how diﬀerent forms of social capital
have enabled these boundary crossings. Finally, we reﬂect on the role of
higher education in navigating these intersections.
5.1. Boundary crossing: sectors and capitals
It was evident that the reform leaders took advantage of – or per-
haps generated – permeability between diﬀerent sectors, and that this
was central to the wide base of support which helped them to be suc-
cessful in bringing about change. Just as they drew upon connections
from diﬀerent sectors, actors also made the most of both bridging and
bonding capital-based networks, although their origins and purposes
were diﬀerent.
Several of the interviewees had experience of both the private and
public sectors. In many ways, the PSPR is a technical administrative
reform, and so many of the people involved had spent part of their
career in corporate jobs where they were very well-paid for the tech-
nical expertise they possess. While this was lucrative, and also taught
them a great deal about the challenges the country was facing, they felt
they could do nothing to help the country from the private sector. For
them, joining government or working for civil society organizations was
an excellent opportunity for personal realization. In the private sector,
one noted, ‘there was no passion in my job’ (PSPR, f); while another
said about his work in civil society: ‘it is also personal, a passion…you
work in your personal time’ (PSPR, m). While they had to renounce the
economic beneﬁts they could gain in business, they seemed satisﬁed
with their choices.
For those who stayed in government, the reasons varied, but many
of the leaders have their own rescue narrative where their participation
in government can make a diﬀerence in the future of the country. From
the MER movement, there were Muslim leaders who had started as
activists and highly critical of government, but gradually came to rea-
lise that ‘…if I really want to eﬀect changes in society, being in gov-
ernment would give you the authority and the powers to do that’ (MER,
m). But government work is not a heaven of altruism: ‘After I joined
government, I realized that there were few of us who really care and I
could see many in government who just wanted to take advantage of
the people you were supposed to help...I can help more if I stay here
(PSPR, m). Similar narratives existed among those who had lucrative
work overseas but chose to return to work in government in the
Philippines: “I had the opportunity of staying (in the US) and being a
small ﬁsh in a big pond, or come back and make a diﬀerence” (PSPR,
m). Circumstances and opportunity also played major roles, not just
their own motivations. Professional prestige and recognition play sig-
niﬁcant roles in being oﬀered a high-level position in government or in
the not-for-proﬁt sector: ‘I was not invisible by this time’ (PSPR, f); ‘…
there was a moment that certain opportunities and skills converged’
(PSPR, m).
Sometimes this boundary crossing was a gradual and iterative pro-
cess, but not always. Among the GK interviewees, several, including the
founder, had started their careers in well-paid positions in multi-na-
tional corporations such as Proctor and Gamble. More than one talked
of a ‘quarter life crisis’ – a turning point in their trajectories where they
realized a sense of mission. A desire to have a sense of ‘credibility and
conviction’ and an opportunity to ‘harness their core’ (GK, f) prompted
a radical rethink of what was important and how to achieve it. A dif-
ferent sort of crossover moment came to a female Muslim GK co-ordi-
nator who went from active involvement in underground military
movements in Mindanao to joining and ultimately progressing through
GK: ‘So, I realized, ok, maybe this is what God gave me and I need to
see, to study what is Gawad Kalinga; maybe this is something new, this
is diﬀerent’.
While the examples above signal permanent career changes in
moving between sectors, there were also examples of those who con-
tinued to cross over at key points in their lives, and some even occupied
dual roles simultaneously. For some PSPR interviewees, public-private
partnership schemes made their return to the private sector possible
and oﬀered the opportunity to capitalize on the experience and
knowledge gained during time in government: ‘I am working now in a
public-private partnership administering a US grant for public pro-
curement’ (PSPR, f). A highly-active GK board member was Philippines
CEO of a major multinational oil corporation; he noted the importance
of bringing a range of expertise and networks to the GK mission.
Of signiﬁcance especially to the ARMM grouping are the bonds but
also bridges concerning religion: religious networks and movements,
especially for Muslims, have been crucial in the struggle for in-
dependence. But the quest for autonomy has meant the peace process
and the organizations supporting it cut across faiths. For example, it is a
Catholic organization that is spearheading electoral reform in
Mindanao.
Ultimately, as one interviewee pointed out, it is not just about ideas,
skills and motivation, making things happen requires being able to push
through reforms which disrupt the status quo. ‘The reform does not end
with a piece of paper. You start with a piece of paper but then you need
to make sure the law gets passed...I mean it is really hard and frus-
trating’ (PSPR, f). Moving between sectors developed both networks
and skills. Para-legal work done by some of the MER respondents sig-
naled how these gave them credibility, but required investment of time
and eﬀort:
I was giving para-legal training to the Unions and farmers, so I
would think because of my experience in diﬀerent sectors, I was able
to establish some sort of network. They look me up. It is easy in the
sense that I might be acceptable to the diﬀerent shades of the left, or
even not the left, maybe a fair person to talk to. (MER, m)
Among some people who kept some personal distance from politics,
there was still respect for ‘political wheels’ who know how to work the
system, and who could protect them and their work. A well-respected
GK founder who bridged the worlds of the Church, academia and ac-
tivist politics described his ‘brokering’ role between these worlds, with
diﬀerent forms of authority bestowed upon him by his diﬀerent hats.
While the diverse perspectives and skills that come from boundary
crossing point to the importance of bridging capital, key individuals
also exploited the advantages of bonding capital. Prominent Filipino Ed
Campos spearheaded the PSPR from within his inﬂuential roles in the
World Bank and USAID as well as national level. While all of these roles
gave him both the legitimacy of international backers and the agency to
act on it nationally, it is no coincidence that he was from an elite family
in the Philippines and was able use this capital and prestige to bring
support from national actors into the report. Local and dynastic struc-
tures of power are closely linked to traditional oligarchies nationally.
One woman from PSPR argued that ‘the Philippines is a very small
country. They (congressmen and senators) all come from the same
school, the same family’.
5.2. The role of higher education
Much of the literature linking higher education to development is
situated within a human capital logic which suggests that what matters
most are the knowledge and the skills people acquire through the
formal channels of teaching and learning. These, it is argued, are what
students, their families and the state are investing in, with a view to
increasing private and public returns through future productivity in the
labour market. As a starting point, the concept of developmental lea-
dership questions this understanding of how progress happens by
highlighting the importance of individual leader agency and develop-
mental coalitions in making positive change happen, over and above
economic improvements through upskilling the labour market.
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Certainly the ﬁndings of this study suggest that education in general
and higher education in particular need to be seen ‘in the round’, with
the networking and extra-curricular possibilities on oﬀer clearly
playing at least an equal role to the teaching and learning functions of
institutions. The seeds for some of the boundary crossings mentioned
above were planted through new kinds of relationships with diﬀerent
groups of people and through social conscientisation experienced at
university.
Few of the interviewees were impressed by the formal education
they had in schools and higher education institutions in the Philippines.
For many of them, it was a case of developing higher order skills –
leadership, critical thinking, analytical capability – through their own
initiatives or outside the classroom. Indeed, many of the interviewees
were quite dismissive of the pedagogies they experienced, and the
nature of the curriculum, and felt that they had acquired the knowl-
edge, skills and attitudes necessary for development leadership despite
their formal education, rather than because of it. Rote learning was the
normal order of things across a full range of institutions (‘what I re-
member most is just a lot of memorization’, said one female GK leader).
One male GK respondent, still actively engaged in HE at high levels,
noted disparagingly that ‘80% of what we did is useless’. In terms of the
content of their studies, some useful technical skills were of course
acquired and the degree from a prestigious university signaled this to
employers. A substantial proportion of the interviewees, however,
changed disciplines during their studies, again reinforcing the sense of
boundary crossing and the importance of transferable skills as much as
specialist learning.
Pedagogy generally encouraged passivity; more than one inter-
viewee used the terms ‘exposed to’ when talking about key texts or
ideas they learned while studying at university. In other words, they
were not encouraged to engage critically with texts, but having them on
a particular course syllabus meant that they were discovered by those
who were inspired by them, rather than anything inspiring happening
with them as part of their studies. Many were auto-didacts, some ex-
tremely so. Their own reading, and motivation to learn, were major
shapers of learning. As one GK co-founder and HE leader said:
I had always been interested in social reform from a way back so I
had read about the People’s Revolution. Then I had actually read a
lot of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung and so forth beforehand, so I had
some understanding both historically and theoretically of these
things.
This particular leader was actually educated ﬁrst in the seminary
and then studied Mathematics overseas, and so this important reading
was not part of his formal education. Also pointing to the narrowness of
the curriculum and how it limits understanding, one leader within the
Mindanao electoral reform process mentioned how his Catholic college
had suppressed liberation theology rather than discussing it.
In the preparation years for higher education, leaders experienced a
schooling system which was not always inclusive. Most of the Muslim
leaders interviewed had attended Catholic schools as these were per-
ceived by parents to be of higher quality. However, there were pitfalls.
One GK leader from Mindanao reported experiencing bullying and
spending most of her time in the library avoiding confrontations.
Another way in which schooling processes perpetuate disadvantages
and reinforce divisions is through language. Respondents who came
from homes where English was regularly used noted the advantages this
gave them in elite schools and then later in higher education, where
English is the medium of instruction. Catholic schools are often segre-
gated by sex, which, as one interviewee remarked, means that young
people do not learn to deal with the opposite sex early in life.
However, by the time they reached university, while pedagogy may
not have been particularly inclusive or inspiring, these leaders found
that they were meeting a much wider range of people than at earlier
stages of their studies. Over half of the interviewees attended elite
higher education institutions. Most of them were not from elite
backgrounds, but either scholarships or family sacriﬁce had enabled
them to reach this level. So for some of them, starting university meant,
for the ﬁrst time, they were mixing with people from other socio-eco-
nomic strata. Given the tendency in schools to segregate by sex and
religion, for many it was also the ﬁrst time they mixed regularly with
people of the opposite sex or other religions (with the exception of
Muslim interviewees, many of whom attended Catholic schools). Given
that elite universities are situated in Manila but attract students from
across the Philippines, it was also an opportunity to learn how people
live in other parts of the Philippines. In explaining their involvement in
reforms, many participants talked about how education had enabled
them to mix with people. One (MER, m) pointed out how Muslims have
around 30 ethnic groups, with their own languages and cultures; he had
to navigate ways to build friendships, which had been nurtured by early
experience of appreciation of Muslim, Catholic and Chinese friends.
Meeting students from all over the country as part of a ‘democratized
culture’ was seen to open minds.
The sites for these interactions were rarely named as the lecture
theatre or seminar room, where the prevailing pedagogies distanced
students from each other. Rather, extra-curricular activities of all kinds
created opportunities for interaction and for the exercise of leadership.
These acted as platforms for personal development and conscientisation
as well as exposure to political or in some cases underground move-
ments. This took a range of forms. Even cheerleading (as in the case of
one female GK leader) helped respondents to develop leadership and
teambuilding skills with new and diverse contacts. Several interviewees
served as year, disciplinary or student body presidents, or were in-
volved in campus journalism or charitable organisations. As one GK
leader summed up, such activities could be the ﬁrst independent ex-
pression of one’s own interests and potential:
I think deﬁnitely my extra-curricular (activities) developed the most
important aspects of myself that would help me as a leader.
Everything is applied, and it is something that you choose.
Education in the university of course you choose your course, but
the requirements of that course are more or less imposed upon you
and typically anyone would choose to want to go to college because
that’s what society dictates or expects of one. But your parents are
not exactly pushing you to join the student council, which meant
that if it’s your own choice then you have to follow through on that
decision.
Several leaders were heavily involved in student politics and wider
political activism. One GK leader, for example, set up his own new
student political party at university to avoid getting co-opted into tra-
ditional elites and all that was associated with them. Within the
Mindanao group of leaders, rallies or protests about the ARMM, wo-
men’s advocacy organisations, chairing the Bangsomoro Student
Alliance or joining a group called Samaha Propogandista (the move-
ment of propaganda in the Philippines) were examples.
Many of the older leaders were at university during the period of
unrest stemming from martial law in the late Marcos era. Even the
Catholic Association was politicized, with prayers for democracy.
References to the impact of this period of unrest were prominent across
all three reforms. Student activism was a crucial period of socialization
into public issues, and at UP, it was a distinct part of campus life. As one
male Procurement Reform respondent noted: ‘it is diﬃcult not to be an
activist when you are in the UP’. Engagement with the People Power
movement at this sensitive stage of development was central to their
developing understandings of the injustices experienced by many, in-
cluding fellow students, and of how to create change. At institutions
where politicization was less encouraged, a particular ethos gave moral
grounding to some: for one, the Jesuit motto of ‘being a man for others’,
embedded in the ethos of Ateneo University, inﬂuenced activities and
community work.
Many of these activities fostered a community orientation and also
gave experience of mixing with people from diﬀerent strata of society –
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seen as important in their leadership orientation and sense of mission as
well as the development of bridging capital. The one participant from
the ARMM electoral reform who did not ﬁnish college, nonetheless had
a legacy from her Catholic school times of community work and ‘active
compassion’. But this was not just one-way charity, but also involve-
ment. For some participants in PSPR, service learning opportunities
oﬀered by their elite institutions – such as voluntary placements in poor
communities – were an important causal factor in their interest in social
issues. Meeting the poor is seen as good preparation for working for
government: ‘I really want our students to experience how it is…it is
much like the Jesuit volunteers’ (PSPR, f). Even if coming from an ex-
isting political dynasty, in a democracy (however ﬂawed) leaders have
to engage with a wide range of people to ensure legitimation and
support.
However, not all extra-curricular activities necessarily led to a
stronger sense of justice, leadership skills, or greater independence, and
the powerful role of sororities and especially fraternities at elite in-
stitutions is salient here. Initiation rites to some of these involve phy-
sical abuse (‘hazing’), promises of unquestioning loyalty, and vows of
silence. These can then thwart anti-corruption measures later in the
careers of the brothers. For the majority (but not all) of the develop-
mental leaders in this research, fraternities were viewed as potentially
non-developmental coalitions operating in the Philippines political and
social landscape. Given their nature and the tendency to recruit from
particular social strata or even kinship groups, they arguably constitute
an example of some of the negative excesses of bonding capital. It is
interesting that at a recent GK volunteer event involving a range of
fraternities and sororities, the leaders symbolically presented their
hazing paddles to the GK leader in the opening ceremony, indicating
that in that space, those associations were abandoned for a wider so-
lidarity.
It was in later life, once the trajectory to leadership and driving
change was underway, that the accumulation of bridging capital at
university bore fruit. Student experience in various activist movements
gave lifetime bonds and fellowship. One participant was Chair of the
National Union of Students in the Philippines and still in touch with
both the ‘younger crop’ who asked him to speak, and with con-
temporaries who are pressing him to run for Senate, saying ‘We can
help you’ (MER, m). Another revived an organization called the
Political Science Club, with other majors in Political Science, and these
alumni are now in Mindanao UP having created a similar organization.
Such participants cited particular ‘batchmates’ (a term used in the
Philippines for people who are of the same academic cohort) who are
now part of their networks for reform, and the fact that people were
batchmates means that ‘the network is still there and it’s easy for us to
build alliances’ (MER, m). One female ARMM peace process leader had
been in the same class as her husband studying Economics, and her
husband’s vast business network could be drawn on: ‘I can cross over
and ask them to help’. The same woman had also maintained an e-group
from her time at the Kennedy School in the US, which was particularly
valuable ‘because many of them have been in Cabinet, so that is a very
strong network and when they support the peace process for instance it
makes ripples all over the place’. Similarly, ‘it is only now,’ reported a
female GK leader, ‘that I’m seeing these relationships intertwine with
my professional life. I think now is the time that our batch is settling
into their speciﬁc roles so now they are at a level where they could
inﬂuence some decisions’.
Such networks have myriad functions. Funding is one of them. A
leader in the ARMM reform still has lunch with her high school mates
once a month and ‘begs money for projects’. Generally, there seemed to
be little embarrassment about tapping into one’s networks, and the
culture of the Philippines seems to expect it. Members are ‘lifetime
friends’:
You never really move. You just expand. They are everywhere also, I
mean the people in the university, my contemporaries…can be
found everywhere, in government, in the private sector; also some of
them are still in the movement. But we keep in touch. It’s part of the
fellowship that you feel for each other even if you don’t agree on
many things (ARMM Peace Panel, f)
Beyond their own studies, several interviewees had sustained an
ongoing academic role and crossed between their university positions
and roles in government or civil society at diﬀerent points in their lives.
Structurally, the Philippines system facilitates this, with people holding
several oﬃces simultaneously, or secondments making it possible to
move temporarily without permanent commitment or lost ground.
6. Conclusion
The amplifying power of networks depends largely on the capacity
of the members of the network to mobilise resources of diﬀerent types.
In highly stratiﬁed societies, movements that are better connected to
the centres of economic, political and symbolic power will be better
able to achieve their goals than those that are not so well positioned in
this hierarchy. On the other hand, the connections with established
powers imply compromises of diﬀerent kinds that those that promote
structural or radical changes might be reluctant to accept (Tarrow and
Tollefson, 1994). This is why social movements like GK, which aim to
transform the values of society and dominant views on development,
have to be very selective in their relationship with established powers.
Other reformers, like the PSPR group, that pursue less controversial
aims simply need to ensure that they have the most powerful allies in
their network, in order to defeat political resistance from powerful
actors. In the case of the MER, where the actors are transitioning from
disruptive politics towards reformism and steady integration within the
political structures of the system, the connections between the move-
ment and the political authorities are crucial for the advancement of
dialogue and the peace building process. In this study, across all three
movements we ﬁnd leaders able to draw on networks across centres of
activity and power, who also themselves move between them in their
lifecourse. While technology was not often indicated to be a strong
force in facilitating this networking, except where contacts were over-
seas and not directly involved in the Philippines, ICT is likely to play an
increasingly important role and will an agenda for future research.
This study suggests that in the Philippines, higher education ex-
periences are important sources of the social capital which facilitates
that resource mobilization. Prevailing evidence (Brannelly et al., 2011)
and individual studies elsewhere (e.g. Jones et al., 2014) also point to
the importance of higher education in providing opportunities for the
proliferation of such networks. However, beyond the simple accumu-
lation of this social capital, it is also the skill of working across these
diverse networks and the cultivating of bridging capital as well as the
exploitation of bonding capital that make a diﬀerence. The particula-
rities of the Philippines as a diverse and stratiﬁed society make this
especially important – but it is certainly not alone in these character-
istics. It is not just the acquisition of this capital that is important, but
the skills to mobilise it in ways that break through political blockages
and build deep and broad support for developmental change. In this
study, it was experiential learning – trialled and tested in extra-curri-
cular activities during study and then reﬁned and operationalized in
cross-over activities in later career – that developed such skills.
Higher education is arguably a necessary but not suﬃcient condi-
tion for the nurturing of developmental leadership and such networks
and skills. What is particularly intriguing about the perspectives of the
developmental leaders in this study is that they shed new light on the
purposes of higher education and the mechanisms through which it can
contribute to development. The human capital arguments which drive
much of higher education policy globally overlook other signiﬁcant
roles for universities: as sites of leadership development; as sources of
bridging capital and the skills to acquire and use it; and as a workplace
where leaders can spend part of their time or part of their career and
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cross-fertilise skills and knowledge with other sectors. The formal
teaching and learning functions of universities for students seemed to
play relatively insigniﬁcant roles in these.
Just after the completion of this research – while the principal in-
vestigator was in the Philippines to present ﬁndings to the Philippines
Association of State Universities and Colleges in mid-2016 – the new
President Rodrigo Duterte was sworn into oﬃce. He is the ﬁrst pre-
sident from Mindanao to hold this oﬃce, and early signs are that his
close networks are playing important roles in his Presidency. Most of
his cabinet appointees are colleagues from Mindanao. He prides himself
on a limited social network, though his background speaks of sig-
niﬁcant political capital with his father being a former mayor of Cebu
and governor of Davao. His tenure so far is marked by extra-judicial
killings and a questionable approach to human rights. Despite the
controversies surrounding his tenure, his trust ratings remain high and
he maintains a popular following among Filipinos who applaud his
grassroots approach and disposition to eliminate poverty, crime and
corruption in the country. He has pushed for a multi stakeholder agenda
in consolidating peace in his own region and has highlighted the need
to further develop Mindanao (and other parts of the country). He is
presented as someone who is set to remove predatory leaders that
hinder the country’s development. How developmental leaders in the
Philippines will respond to this, what spaces are opened or closed for
progressive coalitions, and what the past and present roles of higher
education will be, remain to be seen.
References2
Asian Development Bank, 2015. Asian Development Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s
Future Growth. Asian Development Bank. available at: http://www.adb.org/
publications/asian-development-outlook-2015-ﬁnancing-asias-future-growth
(Accessed 15 July 2015).
Anderson, I., Hipgrave, D., 2015. Philippines Political Economy Assessment Report. .
available at: http://www.unicef.org/health/ﬁles/Philippines_PEA_-_design_version_
28May15.pdf (Accessed 8 August 2015).
Ateneo de Manila University, 2016. Prospectus. Ateneo de Manila, Manila.
Bavister-Gould, A., 2011. Predatory Leaderships, Predatory Rule and Predatory States.
(Developmental Leadership Program, Concept Paper 1*).
Brannelly, L., Lewis, L., Ndaruhutse, S., 2011. Higher Education and the Formation of
Developmental Elites: A Literature Review and Preliminary Data Analysis. (DLP
Research Paper 10 *).
Brautigam, D., Diolle, T., 2009. Coalitions, Capitalists and Credibility: Overcoming the
Crisis of Conﬁdence at Independence in Mauritius. (DLP Research Paper 4 *).
Brillantes Jr., A.B., Fernandez, M.T., 2011. Good governance, social quality, and active
citizenship: Gawad Kalinga in the Philippines. Int. J. Soc. Qual. 1 (2), 19–30.
Campbell, D., 2009. Civic engagement and education: an empirical test of the sorting
model. Am. J. Pol. Sci. 53 (4), 771–786.
Campos, J.E., Syquia, J.L., 2005. Managing the Politics of Reform: Overhauling the Legal
Infrastructure of Public Procurement in the Philippines Vol. 70 World Bank
Publications.
Chua, Y.T., Rimban, L.R., 2011. Democracy at Gunpoint: Election Related Violence in the
Philippines. VERA Files/The Asia Foundation.
Chua, K.K., Mylenko, N., Chaudhury, N., Figueroa-Geron, C., Hayakawa, M., Enerva, M.,
2013. Philippine Development Report: Creating More and Better Jobs (No. ACS5842).
The World Bank, pp. 1–312.
Fukuyama, F., 2002. Social capital and development: the coming agenda. SAIS Rev. 22
(1), 23–37.
Grindle, M.S., 2004. Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in
developing countries. Governance 17 (4), 525–548.
Gutierrez, E.U., Torrente, I.C., Narca, N.G., 1992. All in the Family: A Study of Elites and
Power Relations in the Philippines. Institute for Popular Democracy.
Hedman, E.-L.E., 2006. In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to
People Power in the Philippines. University of Hawaii Press.
Hite, N.F., 2012. Economic Modernization and the Disruption on Patronage Politics:
Experimental Evidence from the Philippines. Yale University.
Jones, A., Jones, C., Ndaruhutse, S., 2014. Higher Education and Developmental
Leadership: The Case of Ghana, Developmental Leadership Program. Research Paper
26 *.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2009. Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996–2008 World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper, No. 4978. available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1424591 (Accessed 14 July 2015).
Khemani, S., 2013. Buying Votes Vs. Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to
Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No.
6339. available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208343
(Accessed 8 August 2015).
Leftwich, A., 2009. Bringing Agency Back In: Politics and Human Agency in Building
Institutions and States, Development Leadership Programme. (Research Paper 6*).
Lewis, D., 2013. Sideways strategies: civil society-state reformist crossover activities in
the Philippines 1986–2010. Contemp. Southeast Asia 35 (1), 27.
Lyne de Ver, H., 2009. Conceptions of Leadership. (Developmental Leadership Program,
Background Paper 4*).
McCowan, T., 2016. Universities and the post-2015 development agenda: an analytical
framework. High. Educ. 72 (4), 505–523.
NEDA, 2015. The National Economic and Development Authority. available at: http://
www.neda.gov.ph/ (Accessed 27 August 2015).
Olson, M., 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
revised ed. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Phillips, S., 2011. Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State.
(Developmental Leadership Program Research Paper 14*).
Phillips, S., 2013. Political Settlements and State Formation: The Case of Somaliland.
(Developmental Leadership Program Research Paper 23*).
Putnam, R., 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
Simon & Schuster, New York.
QS, 2015. QS Top Universities in Asia. Available at: http://www.topuniversities.com/
asian-rankings.
Rodriguez, A.M., Lacundula-Rodriguez, T.A. (Eds.), 2009. Agenda for Hope:
Democratizing Governance. Ateneo de Manila University Press, Manila.
Sebudubudu, D., 2009. Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the Development of Botswana.
Developmental Leadership Program, Research Paper 2*.
Sidel, J.T., 2014. Achieving Reforms in Oligarchical Democracies: the Role of Leadership
and Coalitions in the Philippines. Developmental Leadership Program, Research
Paper 27*.
Stiglitz, J., 2003. Towards a new paradigm of development. In: John Dunning, H. (Ed.),
Making Globalization Good. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 76–107.
Symaco, L.P., 2014. Education and poverty in the Philippines. Education, Poverty,
Malnutrition and Famine. A & C Black.
Tadros, M., 2011. Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and Agency in a
Comparative Study of Women’s Coalitions in Egypt and Jordan. (Developmental
Leadership Programme Research Paper 12*).
Tarrow, S., Tollefson, J., 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action
and Politics. Cambridge Univ Press.
Teichler, U., 2008. Diversiﬁcation? Trends and explanations of the shape and size of
higher education. High. Educ. 56, 349.
Theron, M., 2011. African Trends and Transformation: The Proﬁles of Sub-Saharan
African Heads of State Since Independence. (Developmental Leadership Programme
Research Paper 17*).
UP GE Task Force (nd). A Framework for General Education in the University of the
Philippines in the 21 st Century. Available at: http://www.upd.edu.ph/∼updinfo/
jun15/articles/2015UPGEFrameworkDraft1e_with%20Annex%201.pdf.
Villanueva, R.H.A., 2010. The Human Endeavor of Intentional Communities: The Gawad
Kalinga Movement. The University of Arizona. available at: http://gradworks.umi.
com/34/12/3412169.html (Accessed 9 August 2015).
Winters, J.A., 2011. Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York.
2 All Developmental Leadership Papers* can be accessed at the DLP website: http://
www.dlprog.org/.
M. Schweisfurth et al. International Journal of Educational Development 59 (2018) 1–8
8
